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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW.
THE EXPERIENCE OF ACTIVITY.1
BY PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES,
Harvard University.
BRETHREN OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION :
In casting about me for a subject for your President this
year to talk about it has seemed to me that our experiences of
activity would form a good one; not only because the topic is so
naturally interesting, and because it has lately led to a good
deal of rather inconclusive discussion, but because I myself
am growing more and more interested in a certain systematic
way of handling questions, and want to get others interested
also, and this question strikes me as one in which, although I
am painfully aware of my inability to communicate new dis-
coveries or to reach definitive conclusions, I yet can show, in a
rather definite manner, how the method works.
The way of handling things I speak of, is, as you already
will have suspected, that known sometimes as the pragmatic
method, sometimes as humanism, sometimes as Deweyism, and
in France, by some of the disciples of Bergson, as the Philo-
sophie nouvelle. Professor Woodbridge's Journal of Philoso-
phy seems unintentionally to have become a sort of meeting
place for those who follow these tendencies in America. There
is only a dim identity among them; and the most that can be
said at present is that some sort of gestation seems to be in the
atmosphere, and that almost any day a man with a genius for
finding the right word for things may hit upon some unifying
1
 President's Address before the American Psychological Association, Phila-
delphia Meeting, December, 1904.
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and conciliating formula that will make so much vaguely simi-
lar aspiration crystallize into more definite form.
I myself have given the name of ' radical empiricism' to that
version of the tendency in question which I prefer; and I pro-
pose, if you will now let me, to illustrate what I mean by radi-
cal empiricism, by applying it to activity as an example, hoping
at the same time incidentally to leave the general problem of
activity in a slightly — I fear very slightly — more manageable
shape than before.
Mr. Bradley calls the question of activity a scandal to philoso-
phy, and if one turns to the current literature of the subject —
his own writings included — one easily gathers what he means.
The opponents cannot even understand one another. Mr.
Bradley says to Mr. Ward: " I do not care what your oracle is,
and your preposterous psychology may here be gospel if you
please ; * * * but if the revelation does contain a meaning I will
commit myself to this : either the oracle is so confused that its
signification is not discoverable, or, upon the other hand, if it
can be pinned down to any definite statement, then that state-
ment will be false."1 Mr. Ward in turn says of Mr. Bradley :
" I cannot even imagine the state of mind to which his description
applies. * * * It reads like an unintentional travesty of Herbart-
ian Psychology by one who has tried to improve upon it with-
out being at the pains to master it." Miinsterberg excludes a
view opposed to his own by saying that with any one who holds
it a Verstandigung with him is " grundsatzlick ausgescklossen ";
and Royce, in a review of Stout:2 hauls him over the coals at
great length for defending ' efficacy' in a way which I, for one,
never gathered from reading him, and which I have heard Stout
himself say was foreign to the intention of his text.
In these discussions distinct questions are habitually jumbled
and different points of view are talked of durcheinander. There
is a psychological question: " Have we perceptions of activity ?
and if so, what are they like, and when and where do we have
them ?" There is a metaphysical question : " I s there a fact
of activity ? and if so, what idea must we frame of it ? What
Appearance and Reality, p. 117.—Obviously-written at Ward, though
Ward's name is not mentioned.
*Mind, N. S., VI., 379.
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is it like ? and what does it do, if it does anything ? " and
finally there is a logical question: " Whence do we know activ-
ity ? By our own feelings of it solely ? or by some other source
of information ? " Throughout page after page of the literature
one knows not which of these questions is before one ; and mere
description of the surface show of experience is proferred as if
it implicitly answered every one of them. No one of the dis-
putants, moreover, tries to show what pragmatic consequences
his own view would carry, or what particular practical differences
it would make if his adversary's were triumphant.
It seems to me that if radical empiricism be good for any-
thing, it ought, with its pragmatic method and its principle of
pure experience, to be able to avoid such tangles, or at least to
simplify them somewhat. The pragmatic method starts from
the postulate that there is no difference of truth that doesn't
make a difference of fact somewhere ; and it seeks to determine
the meaning of all differences of opinion by making the dis-
cussion lead as soon as possible to some practical issue. The
principle of pure experience is also a postulate. Nothing shall
be admitted as fact, it says, except what can be experienced at
some definite time by some experient; and for every feature of
fact ever so experienced, a definite place must be found some-
where in the final system of reality. In other words : Every-
thing real must be experienced, and every kind of thing experi-
enced must somewhere be real.
Armed with these rules of method let us see what face the
problems of activity present to us.
By the principle of pure experience, either the word ' activ-
ity ' must have no meaning at all, or else the original type and
model of what it means must lie in some concrete kind of
experience that can be definitely pointed out. Whatever ulte-
rior judgments we may eventually come to make regarding
activity, that sort of thing will be what the judgments are about.
The first thing to do then is to ask where in the stream of
experience we seem to find what we speak of as activity.
What we are to think of the activity thus found will be a later
question.
Now it is obvious that we are tempted to affirm activity
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wherever we find anything going on. Taken in the broadest
sense, any apprehension of something doing, is an experience
of activity. Were our world describable only by the words
' nothing happening,' ' nothing changing,' we should unques-
tionably call it an ' inactive ' world. Elementary activity then,
as we may call it, means the bare fact of event or change.
' Change taking place' is a unique content of experience, one of
those ' conjunctive relations' between its successive parts which
radical empiricism seeks so earnestly to rehabilitate and pre-
serve. The sense of activity is thus in the broadest and vaguest
way synonymous with the sense of ' life.' We should feel our
own subjective life at least, even in noticing and proclaiming
an otherwise inactive world. Our own reaction on its monotony
would be the one thing experienced there in the form of an
event.
This seems to be what certain writers have in mind when
they insist that for an experient to be at all is to be active. It
seems to justify, or at any rate to explain, Mr. Ward's expres-
sion that we are only as we are active,1 for we are only as ex-
perients; and it rules out Mr. Bradley's contention that " there
is no original experience of anything like activity." What we
ought to say about activities thus elementary, whose they are,
what they effect, or whether indeed they effect anything at all
— these are later questions to be answered only when the field
of experience is enlarged.
Elementary activity would thus be predicable, though there
were no definite direction, no actor, and no aim. Mere restless
zigzag movement, or a wild Ideenjlucht, or Rhafsodie der
Wakrnekmungen, as Kant would say, would constitute an ac-
tive as distinguished from an inactive world.
But in this actual world of ours, as it is given, a part at
least of the activity comes with definite direction; it comes with
desire and sense of goal; it comes complicated with resistances
which it overcomes or succumbs to, and with the efforts which
the feeling of resistance so often provokes; and it is in complex
experiences like these that the notions of distinct agents, and of
1
 Naturalism and Agnosticism, II., 245. One thinks naturally of the peri-
patetic actus primus and adus secundus here.
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passivity as opposed to activity arise. Here also the notion of
causal efficacy comes to birth. Perhaps the most elaborate
work ever done in descriptive psychology has been the analysis
by various recent writers of the more complex activity-situa-
tions.1 In their descriptions, exquisitely subtle some of them,2
the activity appears as the gestaltqualitdt or the Jundirte in halt
(or as whatever else you may please to call the conjunctive
form) which the content falls into when we experience it in the
ways which the describers set forth. Those factors in those
relations are what we mean by activity-situations; and to the
possible enumeration and accumulation of their circumstances
and ingredients there would seem to be no natural bound.
Every hour of human life could contribute to the picture gallery ;
and this is the only fault that one can find with such descriptive
industry — where is it going to stop? Ought we to listen for-
ever to verbal pictures of what we have already in concrete
form in our own breasts?3 They never take us off the super-
ficial plane. We knew the facts already — less spread out and
separated, to be sure — but we knew them still. We always
felt our own activity, for example, as ' the expansion of an
idea with which our Self is identified, against an obstacle';
and the following out of such a definition through a multitude
of cases elaborates the obvious so as to be little more than an
exercise in synonymic speech.
All the descriptions have to trace familiar outlines, and to
use familiar terms. The activity is, for example, attributed
•I refer to such descriptive work as Ladd's (Psychology, Descriptive and
Explanatory, Part I., Chap. V., Part II., Chap. XI., Part III., Chaps. XXV.
and XXVI.); as Sully's {The Human Mind, Part V.) ; as Stout's (Analytic
Psychology, Book I., Chap. VI., and Book II., Chaps. I., II. and III.) ; as
Bradley's (in his long series of analytic articles on Psychology in Mind) ; as
Titchener's (Outline of Psychology, Part I., Chap. VI.) ; as Shand's (Mind,
N. S., III., 449; IV., 450; VI., 289); as Ward's (Mind, XII., 67 ff., aDd 564) ;
as Ivoveday's (Mind, N. S., X., 455); as Ijpps's (Vom Fiihlen, Wollen und
Denken, 1902, Chaps. II., IV., VI.); and as Bergson's (Revue Philosophique,
Lin., 1) —to mention only a few writings which I immediately recall.
* Their existence forms a curious commentary on Prof. Munsterberg's dogma
that will-attitudes are not describable. He himself has contributed in a su-
perior way to their description, both in his Willenshandlung, and in his Grund-
zuge, Part n., Chap. IX., g 7.
81 ought myself to cry peccavi, having been a voluminous sinner in my
own chapter on the will.
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either to a physical or to a mental agent, and is either aimless or
directed. If directed it shows tendency. The tendency may
or may not be resisted. If not, we call the activity immanent,
as when a body moves in empty space by its momentum, or our
thoughts wander at their own sweet will. If resistance is met,
two agents complicate the situation. If now, in spite of resis-
tance, the original tendency continues, effort makes its appear-
ance, and along with effort, strain or squeeze. Will, in the
narrower sense of the word then comes upon the scene, when-
ever, along with the tendency, the strain and squeeze are
sustained. But the resistance may be great enough to check
the tendency, or even to reverse its path. In that case, we (if
' we' were the original agents) are overpowered. The phe-
nomenon turns into one of tension simply, or of necessity suc-
cumbed-to, according as the opposing power is only equal, or
is superior to ourselves.
Whosoever describes an experience in such terms as these
describes an experience of activity. If the word have any
meaning it must denote what there is found. There is complete
activity in its original and first intention. What it is «known-as'
is what there appears. The experiencer of such a situation
possesses all that the idea contains. He feels the push, the
obstacle, the will, the strain, the triumph or the passive giving
up, just as he feels the time, the space, the swiftness or inten-
sity, the movement, the weight and color, the pain and pleas-
ure, the complexity, or whatever remaining characters the situ-
ation may involve. He goes through all that ever can be
imagined where activity is supposed. If we suppose activities
to go on outside of our experience it is in forms like these that
we must suppose them, or else give them some other name; for
the word 'activity' has no content save these experiences of
process, obstruction, striving, strain, or release, ultimate qualia
as they are of the life given us to be known.
Were this the end of the matter, one might think that when-
ever we had successfully lived through an activity-situation we
should have to be permitted, without provoking contradiction,
to say that we had been really active, that we had met real
resistance and had really prevailed. Lotze somewhere says
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that to be an entity all that is necessary is to gelten as an entity,
to operate, or be felt, experienced, recognized, or in any way
realized, as such. In our activity-experiences the activity as-
suredly fulfils Lotze's demand. It makes itself gelten. It is
witnessed at its work. No matter what activities there may
really be in this extraordinary universe of ours, it is impossible
to conceive of any one of them being either lived through or
authentically known otherwise than in this dramatic shape of
something sustaining a felt purpose against felt obstacles and
overcoming or being overcome. What ' sustaining' means here
is clear to anyone who has lived through the experience, but to
no one else; just as c loud,'' red,' ' sweet,' mean something only
to beings with ears, eyes and tongues. The -percifi in these
originals of experience is the esse; the curtain is the picture.
If there is anything hiding in the background, it ought not to be
called activity, but should get itself another name.
This seems so obviously true that one might well experi-
ence astonishment at finding so many of the ablest writers on the
subject flatly denying that the activity we live through in these
situations is real. Merely to feel active is not to be active, in
their sight. The agents that appear in the experience are not
real agents, the resistances do not really resist, the effects that
appear are not really effects at all.1 It is evident from this that
1Verbotutn gratiA: "The feeling of activity is notable, qua feeling, to tell
ns anything about activity" (Loveday: Mind, N. S., X., 463); "A sensation
or feeling or sense of activity * * * is not, looked at in another way, a feeling
of activity at all. It is a mere sensation shut up -within which you could by no
reflection get the idea of activity. * * * Whether this experience is or is not
later on a character essential to our perception and our idea of activity, it, as it
comes first, is not in itself an experience of activity at all. It, as it comes first,
is only so for extraneous reasons and only so for an outside observer" (Bradley,
Appearance and Reality, 2d edition, p. 605); "In dem Tatigkeitsgefiihle liegt
an sich nicht der geringste Beweis fur das Vorhandensein einer psychischen
Tatigkeit" (MUnsterberg: Grundziige, etc., p. 67). I could multiply similar
quotations and would have introduced some of them into my text to make it
more concrete, save that the mingling of different points of view in most of
these author's discussions (not in MUnsterberg's) make it impossible to disen-
tangle exactly what they mean. I am sure in any case, to be accused of mis-
representing them totally, even in this note, by omission of the context, so the
less I name names and the more I stick to abstract characterization of a merely
possible style of opinion, the safer it will be. And apropos of misunderstand-
ings, I may add to this note a complaint on my own account Professor Stout,
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mere descriptive analysis of any one of our activity-experiences
is not the whole story, that there is something still to tell about
them that has led such able thinkers to conceive of a Simon
fure activity, of an activity an sick, that does, and doesn't
merely appear to us to do, and compared with which all this
phenomenal activity is but a specious sham.
The metaphysical question opens here; and I think that the
state of mind of one possessed by it is often something like this :
" I t is all very well," we may imagine him saying, " to talk
about certain experience-series taking on the form of activities,
just as the}' might take on musical or geometric forms. Sup-
pose that they do so; suppose we feel a will to stand a strain.
Does our feeling do more than record the fact ? The will's ac-
tivity meanwhile, is the doing of the fact; and what is the doing
made of before the record is made. What in the will enables it
to act ? And these trains of experience themselves, in which
activities appear, what makes them go at all ? Does the ac-
tivity in one bit of experience bring the next bit into being ?
in the excellent chapter on 'Mental Activity,' in Vol. I., of his Analytic Psy-
chology, takes me to task for identifying spiritual activity with certain mus-
cular feelings and gives quotations to bear him out. They are from certain
paragraphs on ' the Self,' in which my attempt was to show what the central
nucleus of the activities that we call ' ours' is. I fonnd it in certain intra-
cephalic movements which we habitually oppose, as 'subjective,' to the activ-
ities of the transcorporeal world. I sought to show that there is no direct evi-
dence that we feel the activity of an inner spiritual agent as snch (I should now
say the activity of ' consciousness' as such, see my paper ' Does consciousness
exist?' in the Journal ofPhilosophy, Vol. I., p. 477). There are in fact three
distinguishable ' activities' in the field of discussion : the ' elementary' activity
involved in the mere that of experience, in the fact that something is going on,
and the farther specification of this something into two whats, an activity felt as
' ours,' and an activity ascribed to objects. Stout, as I apprehend him, identifies
'our' activity with that of the total experience-process, and when I circumscribe
it as a part thereof, accuses me of treating it as a sort of external appendage to
itself (pp. 162-3), as if I 'separated the activity from the process which is
active.' But all the processes in question are active, and their activity is
inseparable from their being. It was in my book only a question of which
activity deserved the name of 'ours.' So far as we are 'persons,' and con-
trasted and opposed to an ' environment,' movements in our body figure as our
activities ; and I am unable to find any other activities that are ours in this
strictly personal sense. There is a wider sense in which the whole ' choir of
heaven and furniture of the earth' and their activities, are ours, for they are
our 'objects.' But 'we' are here only another name for the total process of
experience, another name for all that is, in fact; and I was dealing with the
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As an empiricist you cannot say so, for you have just declared
activity to be only a kind of conjunctive relation experienced
between bits of experience already made. But what made them
at all ? What propels experience ubcrhauft into being ? There
is the activity that operates; the activity felt is only its super-
ficial sign."
To the metaphysical question, popped upon us in this way, I
must pay serious attention ere I end my remarks, but, before
doing so, let me show that without leaving the immediate retic-
ulations of experience, or asking what makes activity itself act,
we still find the distinction between less real and more real ac-
tivities forced upon us, and are driven to much soul-searching
on the purely phenomenal plane.
We must not forget, namely, in talking of the ultimate char-
acter of our activity-experiences, that each of them is but a
portion of a wider world, one link in the vast chain of processes
of which history is made. Each partial process, to him who
lives through it, defines itself by its origin and its goal; but to
an observer with a wider mind-span who should live outside of
it, that goal would appear but as a provisional halting place,
personal and individualized self exclusively in the passages with which Pro-
fessor Stout finds fault
The individualized self, which I believe to be the only thing properly
called self, is a part of the content of the world experienced. The world ex-
perienced (otherwise called the 'field of consciousness') comes at all times
with our body as its center, center of vision, center of action, center of interest.
Where the body is is ' here' ; when the body acts is ' now'; what the body
touches is ' this'; all other things are ' theres' and ' thens' and ' thats.' These
words of emphasized position imply a systematization of things with reference
to a focus of action and interest which lies in the body; and the systematiza-
tion is now so instinctive (was it ever not so ?) that no developed or active ex-
perience exists for us at all except in that ordered form. So far as ' thoughts'
and ' feelings' can be active, their activity terminates in the activity of the body,
and only through first arousing its activities can they begin to change those of
the rest of the world. The body is the storm center, the origin of coordinates,
the constant place of stress in all that experience-train. Everything circles
round it, and is felt from its point of view. The word ' I,' then, is primarily a
noun of position, just like ' this' and ' here.' Activities attached to ' this' posi-
tion have prerogative emphasis, and, if functions have feelings, mnst be felt in
a peculiar way. The word ' my' designates the kind of emphasis. I see no
inconsistency whatever, in defending on the one hand ' my' activities as unique
and opposed to those of outer nature, and on the other hand in affirming, after
introspection, that they consist in movements in the head. The ' my ' of them
is the emphasis, the feeling of perspective-interest in which they are dyed.
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and the subjectively felt activity would be seen to continue into
objective activities that led far beyond. We thus acquire a
habit, in discussing activity-experiences, of defining them by
their relation to something more. If an experience be one of
narrow span, it will be mistaken as to what activity it is and
whose. You think that you are acting and you are only obey-
ing someone's push. You think you are doing this, but you are
doing something of which you do not dream. For instance,
you think you are but drinking this glass; but you are really
creating the liver-cirrhosis that will end your days. You think
you are just driving this bargain, but, as Stevenson says some-
where, you are laying down a link the policy of mankind.
Generally speaking, the ultimate outcome of an activity is
regarded by an onlooker as what it is more really doing; and
the most ^ previous agent ascertainable, being the first source of
action, is regarded as the most real agent in the field. The
others but transmit his impulse; on him we put responsibility;
we name him when one asks us 'Who's to blame?'
But the most previous agents ascertainable, instead of being
of longer span, are often of much shorter span than the activity
in view. Brain-cells are our best example. My brain-cells are
believed to excite each other from next to next (by contiguous
transmission of katabolic alteration, let us say) and to have been
doing so long before this present stretch of lecturing-activity on
my part began. If any one cell-group stops its activity, the lec-
turing will cease or show disorder of form. Cessante causa, cessat
et effectus — does not this look as if the short-span brain activities
were the more real activities, and the lecturing activities on my
part only their effects ? Moreover, as Hume so clearly pointed
out, in my mental activity-situation the words physically to be
uttered are represented as the activity's immediate goal. These
words, however, cannot be uttered without intermediate physical
processes in the bulb and vagi nerves, which processes never-
theless fail to figure in the mental activity-series at all. That
series, therefore, since it leaves out vitally real steps of action,
cannot represent the real activities. It is something purely sub-
jective ; the facts of activity are elsewhere.
The real facts of activity that have in point of fact been sys-
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tematically pleaded for by philosophers have, so far as ray in-
formation goes, been of three principal types.
The first type takes a consciousness of wider time-span than
ours to be the vehicle of the more real activity. Its will is the
agent, and its purpose is the action done.
The second type assumes that ' ideas' struggling with one
another are the agents, and that the prevalence of one set of
them is the action.
The third type believes that nerve-cells are the agents, and
that resultant motor discharges are the acts achieved.
Now if we must de-realize our immediately felt activity-situa-
tions for the benefit of either of these types of substitute, we
ought to know what the substitution practically involves. What
practical difference ought it to make if, instead of saying naively
that ' I ' am active now in delivering this address, I say that a
•wider thinker is active, or that certain ideas are active, or that
certain nerve cells are active, in producing the result?
This would be the pragmatic meaning of the three hypotheses.
Let us take them in succession in seeking a reply.
If we assume a wider thinker, it is evident that his pur-
poses envelope mine. I am really lecturing for him; and
although I cannot surely know to what end, yet if I take him
religiously, I can trust it to be a good end, and willingly connive.
I can be happy in thinking that my activity transmits his im-
pulse, and that his ends prolong my own. So long as I take
him religiously, in short, he does not de-realize my activities.
He tends rather to corroborate the reality of them, so long as I
believe both them and him to be good.
When now we turn to ideas, the case is different, inasmuch
as ideas are supposed by the association psychology to influence
each other only from next to next. The ' span' of an idea or
pair of ideas, is assumed to be much smaller instead of being
larger than that of my total conscious field. The same results
may get worked out in both cases, for this address is being
given anyhow. But the ideas supposed to • really' work it out
had no prevision of the whole of it; and if I was lecturing for
the Absolute in the former case, so, by parity of reasoning, are
my ideas now lecturing for me, that is, accomplishing unwil-
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tingly a result which I approve and adopt. But, when this
passing lecture is over, there is nothing in the bare notion that
ideas have been its agents that would seem to guarantee that my
present purposes in lecturing will be prolonged. / may have
ulterior developments in view; but there is no certainty that
my ideas as such will wish to, or be able to, work them out.
The like is true if nerve-cells be the agents. The activity
of a nerve-cell must be conceived of as a tendency of exceed-
ingly short reach, an ' impulse' barely spanning the way to the
next cell — for surely that amount of actual ' process' must be
' experienced' by the cells if what happens between them is to
deserve the name of activity at all. But here again the gross
result, as / perceive it, is indifferent to the agents, and neither
wished or willed or foreseen. Their being agents now gives
me no guarantee that like results will recur again. In point of
fact all sorts of other results do occur. My mistakes, impo-
tencies, perversions, mental obstructions, and frustrations gen-
erally, are also results of the activity of cells. Although these
are letting me lecture now, on other occasions they make me do
things that I would willingly not do.
The question Whose is the real activity ? is thus tantamount
to the question What will be the actual results f Its interest
is dramatic; how will things work out ? If the agents are of
one sort, one way; of another sort, otherwise as well. The
pragmatic meaning of the various alternatives in short is great.
It makes no merely verbal difference which opinion we take up.
You see it is the old dispute come back ! Materialism and
teleology; elementary short-span actions summing themselves
' blindly,' or far foreseen ideals coming with effort into act.
Naively we believe, and humanly and dramatically we like
to believe, that activities both of wider and of narrower span
are at work in life together, that both are real, and that the'
long-span tendencies yoke the others in their service, encourag-
ing them in the right direction, and damping them when they tend
in other ways. But how to represent clearly the modus aperandi
of such steering of small tendencies by large ones is a problem
which metaphysical thinkers will have to ruminate upon for
many years to come. Even if such control should eventually
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grow clearly picturable, the question how far it is successfully
exerted in this actual world can only be answered by investi-
gating the details of fact. No philosophic knowledge of the
general nature and constitution of tendencies, or of the relation
of larger to smaller ones, can help us to predict which of all
the various competing tendencies that interest us in this universe
are likeliest to prevail. We know as an empirical fact that far-
seeing tendencies often carry out their purpose, but we know
also that they are often defeated by the failure of some com-
temptibly small process on which success depends. A little
thrombus in a statesman's meningeal artery will throw an empire
out of gear. I can therefore not even hint at any solution of
the pragmatic issue. I have only wished to show you that that
issue is what gives the real interest to all inquiries into what
kinds of activity may be real.
I said a while back that I should return to the ' metaphysi-
cal ' question before ending; so, with a few words about that, I
will now close my remarks.
In whatever form we hear this question propounded, I think
that it always arises from two things, a belief that causality must
be exerted in activity, and a wonder as to how causality is made.
If we take an activity situation at its face-value it seems as if we
caught in jlagrante delicto the very power that makes facts come
and be. I now am eagerly striving, for example, to get this
truth which I seem half to perceive, into words which shall
make it show more clearly. If the words come, it will seem as
if the striving itself had drawn or pulled them into actuality out
from the state of merely possible being in which they were.
How is this feat performed? How does the pulling full? How
do I get my hold on words not yet existent, and when they come
by what means have I made them come? Really it is the
problem of creation; for in the end the question is : How do I
make them be ? Real activities are those that really make things
be, without which the things are not, and with which they are
there. Activity, so far as we merely feel it, on the other hand,
is only an impression of ours, one may say; and an impression
is, for all this way of thinking, only a shadow of another fact.
Arrived at this point, I can do little more than indicate the
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principles on which, as it seems to me, a radically empirical
philosophy is obliged to rely in handling such a dispute.
If there be real creative activities in being, radical empiricism
must say, somewhere they must be immediately lived. Some-
where the that of efficacious causing and the what of it must be
experienced in one, just as the what and the that of ' cold ' are
experienced in one whenever a man has the sensation of cold
here and now. It boots not to say that our sensations are fallible.
They are indeed ; but to see the thermometer contradict us when
we say ' it is cold' does not abolish cold as a specific nature
from the universe. Cold is in the arctic circle if not here.
Even so, to feel that our train is moving when the train beside
our window moves, to see the moon through a telescope come
twice as near, or to see two pictures as one solid when we look
through a stereoscope at them, leaves motion, nearness and sol-
idity still in being — if not here, yet each in its proper seat else-
where. And wherever the seat of real causality is, as ultimately
known ' for true' (in nerve-processes, if you will, that cause our
feelings of activity as well as the movements which these seem
to prompt), a philosophy of pure experience can consider the
real causation as no other nature of thing than that which
even in our most erroneous experiences appears to be at work.
Exactly what appears there is what we mean by working,
though we may later come to learn that working was not exactly
there. Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort as
we go, hanging on, and finally achieving our intention — this is
action, this is effectuation in the only shape in which, by a pure
experience-philosophy, the wherabouts of it anywhere can be
discussed. Here is creation in its first intention, here is causality
at work.1 To treat this offhand as the bare surface of a world
1
 I<et me not be told that this contradicts a recent article of mine, ' Does
Consciousness Exist ?' in the Journal of Philosophy for September i, 1904 (see
especially page 489), in which it was said that while ' thoughts' and ' things'
have the same natures, the natures work ' energetically ' on each other in the
things (fire burns, water wets, etc.) but not in the thoughts. Mental activity-
trains are composed of thoughts, yet their members do work on each other,
they check, sustain, and introduce. They do so when the activity is merely
associational as well as when effort is there. But, and this is my reply, they
do so by other parts of their nature than those that energize physically. One
thought in every developed activity-series is a desire or thought of purpose, and
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whose real causality is a more solid way of action hidden in the
cubic deeps, is for the more empirical way of thinking, only
animism is another shape. You explain your given fact by a
• principle,' but the principle itself, when you look clearly at it,
turns out to be nothing but a previous little spiritual edition of
the fact. Away from that one and only kind of fact your mind,
considering causality, can never get.'
I conclude then that real effectual causation as an ultimate
nature, as a ' category,' if you like, of reality, is just what we
feel it to be, just that kind of conjunction which our own ac-
tivity-series reveal. We have the whole butt and being of it
in our hands; and the healthy thing for philosophy is to leave
off grubbing underground for what effects effectuation, or what
makes action act, and to try to solve the concrete questions of
where effectuation in this world is located, of which things are
the true causes there, and of what the more remote effects consist.
all the other thoughts acquire a feeling tone from their relation of harmony or
oppugnancy to this. The interplay of these secondary tones (among which
' interest,' ' difficulty ' and ' effort' figure) runs the drama in the mental series.
In what we term the physical drama these qualities play absolutely no part.
The subject needs careful working out; but I can see no inconsistency.
•I have found myself more than once accused in print of being the
assertor of a metaphysical principle of activity. Since literary misunder-
standings retard the settlement of problems, I should like to say that such
an interpretation of the pages I have published on Effort and on Will is
absolutely foreign to what I meant to express. I owe all my doctrines on this
subject to Renouvier ; and Renouvier, as I understand him, is (or at any rate
then was) an out and out phenomenist, a denier of' forces' in the most strenu-
ous sense. Single clauses in my writing, or sentences read out of their connec-
tion, may possibly have been compatible with a transphenomenal principle of
energy; but I defy anyone to show a single sentence which, taken with its con-
text, should be naturally held to advocate that view. The misinterpretation
probably arose in the first instance from my defending (after Renouvier) the
indeterminism of our efforts. ' Free will' was supposed to involve a super-
natural agent As a matter of plain history the only ' free will' I have ever
thought of defending is the character of novelty in fresh activity-situations. If
an activity-process is the form of a whole 'field of consciousness,' and if each
field of consciousness is not only in its totality unique (as is now commonly
admitted) but has its elements unique (since in that situation they are all dyed
in the total) then novelty is perpetually entering the world and what happens
there is not pure repetition, as the dogma of the literal uniformity of nature
requires. Activity-situations come in short each with an original touch. A
'principle' of free will if there were one, would doubtless manifest itself in
such phenomena, but I never saw, nor do I now see, what the principle could do
except rehearse the phenomenon beforehand, or why it ever should be invoked.
ib WILLIAM JAMES.
From this point of view the greater sublimity traditionally
attributed to the metaphysical inquiry, the grubbing inquiry,
entirely disappears. If we could know what causation really is
in itself, the only use of the knowledge would be to help us to
recognize an actual cause when we had one, and so to track the
actual causal operations out. The mere abstract inquiry into
causation's hidden nature is not more sublime than any other
inquiry equally abstract. Causation inhabits no more sublime
level than anything else. It lives, apparently, in the dirt as well
as in the Absolute, or as in man's unconquerable mind. The
worth and interest of the world consists not in its elements, be
these elements things, or be they the conjunctions of things ; it
exists rather in the dramatic outcome in the whole process, and
in the meaning of the stages, which the elements work out.
My colleague and master, Josiah Royce, in a page of his
review of Stout's ' Analytic Psychology' in Mind for 1897 has
some fine words on this point with which I cordially agree. I
cannot agree with his separating the notion of efficacy from
that of activity altogether (this I understand to be one contention
of his) for activities are efficacious whenever they are real activ-
ities at all. But the inner nature both of efficacy and of activity
are superficial problems, I understand Royce to say; and the
only point for us in solving them would be their possible use
in helping us to solve the far deeper problem of the course and
meaning of the world of life. Life, says our colleague, is full
of significance, of meaning, of success and of defeat, of hoping
and of striving, of longing, of desire, and of inner value. It is
a total presence that embodies worth. To live our own lives
better in this presence is the true reason why we wish to know
the elements of things; so even we psychologists must end on
this pragmatic note.
The urgent problems of activity are thus more concrete.
They are all problems of the true relation of longer-span to
shorter-span activities. When, for example, a number of ' ideas'
(to use the name traditional in psychology) grow confluent in a
larger field of consciousness, do the smaller activities still co-
exist with the wider activities now experienced ? And, if so, do
the wider activities accompany the narrower ones inertly, or do
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they exert control? Or do they rather utterly supplant and re-
place them and short-circuit their effects ? Again, when a men-
tal activity-process and a brain-cell series of activities both ter-
minate in the same muscular movement, does the mental process
steer the neural processes or not? Or, on the other hand, does
it independently short-circuit their effects? Such are the ques-
tions that we must begin with. But so far am I from suggesting
any definitive answer to such questions, that I hardly yet can put
them clearly. They lead, however into that region of pan-
psychic and ontologic speculation of which Professor Bergson
and our colleague Strong have lately enlarged the literature in
so able and interesting a way. The results of these authors seem
in many respects dissimilar, and I understand them as yet but
imperfectly; but I cannot help suspecting that the direction of
their work is very promising, and that the}- have the hunter's
instinct for the fruitful trails. I earnestly recommend the study
of their writings to the members of our two Associations.
